The Self Starter of Toulouse

What has emerged in the aftermath of the shootings in Toulouse has pointed at another spin on the 'lone wolf' theory; that of the motivated self starter. Despite travelling in regions associated with terrorist and insurgent training camps, finding the call of militant Islam and acting in line with religious beliefs it seems Mohamed Merah undertook these actions alone.

The evidence from his actions and background points to a dangerous cocktail of extremist views, a psychotic mindset and a criminal past mixing together to create a man who was capable of carrying out ruthless attacks, up in close proximity with his victims.

 

There were worrying signs from Merah's past; he had allegedly become obsessed with gory terrorist videos and attempted to radicalise Muslim youngsters in his neighbourhood. He reportedly was also a juvenile delinquent, guilty of a host of low level crimes whilst  paradoxically also being into football, theft, women and drinking, not the usual traits of a fundamentally inspired terrorist.

 

In the individual case of Merah the questions now lie with what assistance was provided by those close to him and should he been identified as a threat sooner? ,The issue of whether he should of had closer attention paid to him by France's domestic intelligence agency (DCRI) is a key point for debate, Yet there is a fine line between radical viewpoints and radical actions, keeping tabs on everyone identified as having a radical view becomes a dangerous undertaking...easily capable of inspiring action by those who feel threatened.

The theoretical interest for understanding this and possible future acts like this, lies with two considerations; Is the 'motivated self starter' even more of a threat than the 'lone wolf'? and how much fear is inspired by acts relatively simple to plan and carry out?

 

The 'lone wolf' (as discussed in  http://csaware.blogspot.co.uk/2012/02/lone-wolf-terror.html)  has considerable advantage over the planning and logistical problems faced by small terrorist cells, yet can still be tracked and monitored due to established links and training with terrorist organisations; for example the UK threat of lone wolves points directly to extremists returning from time in countries such as Somalia. Let us for a moment assume that the reports are true and that Merah had no link with Al-Qaeda and that the supposed regional organisations were more inspirational than providers of training; that points to the idea that this 'lone wolf' was able to radicalise and inspire himself to undertake the acts which brought terrorism to the streets of Toulouse. In theory this then becomes the biggest threat, the idea that an individual can be inspired to commit terrorism with little contact with others, to take it one step further Merah could even be an exception in that there were warning signs in his travel and previous acts of violence and crimes, theoretically there could be motivational self starters who could achieve terrorist acts with few or no hints from their past pointing to radicalisation.

 

The acts themselves point to an even more worrying threat; the effectiveness of simple small arms attacks. The events in France have shown that a relatively small number of targets chosen for their religious or ideological significance can shock a country and induce fear, anger and response, all desired outcomes of terrorism. The fact this was achieved by the use of firearms points to the fact that simple conventional violent actions are still easily capable of causing shock and panic. Such actions avoid the chance of detection linked with acquiring explosive ingredients or even more obscure CRBN materials. Guns, whilst still causing suspicion, are far more often linked to the criminal class and thus do not raise the same alarms as more 'traditional' terrorist plots would. Merah was even able to incorporate the suicide martyr element into his actions with his last stand shoot out against police.

The counter consideration in the case of Merah and also in Norwegian massacre carried out by Anders Breivik are that these are two examples of individuals with psychotic and mental issues leading them to carry out violent actions in line with their religious and ideological views. Though undoubtedly identifiable as acts of terrorism they could be argued as horrific crimes which in  post 9/11 age have been linked under the ever growing umbrella of terrorist actions. However what is far more worrying is the idea that these 'lone wolves' are self starters, individuals who have been able to radicalise and arm themselves, giving them the ability to carry out violent acts with little or no help. The brutally simplistic nature of these acts also points to a much more simplified approach in terrorist acts one that is ultimately much harder to detect or predict.

The Power of the Strategic Corporal

Events in Afghanistan over the last few weeks have given prime examples of the dark side of the 'strategic corporal' theory; the idea that the actions of individuals of lower ranks on the ground affect the overall strategic perspective of a conflict zone. The burning of the Korans at the end of last month and the massacre committed by the lone soldier in Kandahar on Sunday contribute to the strategic picture faced by US and ISAF forces in Afghanistan far more than the actions and ideas of senior generals. Based on this theory a conflict zone essentially is shaped by two different strategic actors, the traditional grand strategy framework of army planners, policy makers, generals etc. and the real time strategic picture contributed by the actions of anyone on the 'frontline'. In ideal practise the element of the 'strategic corporals' is in line with and acting on behalf of the large policy based strategy element, yet as these recent events have shown there are increasing scenarios of when the strategic approach of the leaders has been damaged by the actions of soldiers on the business end of the campaign.

In historical reflection the 'strategic corporal' is not as new a concept as some would think, in recent history it is easy to think of the 'strategic lieutenant' in Vietnam, where platoon or company sized actions had the most immediate affect on the strategic picture of parts of the war zone. Earlier still small groups of men would affect the outcomes of skirmishes and battles throughout history if used correctly or tactically in the right place, these would usually be the product of prior planning yet some came from the quick thinking of men on the ground. However these contributed to the military strategic outcome and that is where the historical concept differs from the contemporary; that the actions of individuals in a conflict situation affect far more than just military victory or defeat.

The true idea of the 'strategic corporal' was coined by General Charles C. Krulak in the title of an article in Marines Magazine about the "Three Block War," an increasingly important arena of military operations defined by engagement with hostile, neutral and friendly forces, all at the same time, in a very geographically limited area. If used positively the idea suggests that the lowest ranked NCOs are directly influencing the conflict area on behalf of the main strategy. Though as seen recently the effects are equally as profound if they are acting irresponsibly.

Two sides of the strategic corporal.
 Above: on the ground directly winning hearts and minds.
Below: Marines urinating on Taliban corpses

The fact that a conflict such as Afghanistan has far more actors than just the US and enemy combatants means that the actions of a strategic corporal have far more bearing than they have ever had in history. The native population, media, allies, enemy forces, enemy sympathises, foreign observers and charities are all part of those initially affected by the actions of an individual or small group. This coupled with the speed of the modern media and social communication mean that a massacre such as Sunday has travelled round the world just as quickly as high strategic planners are trying to limit the backlash from such an event.

As such the overall strategic picture is dependent on the actions and image portrayed by the 'frontline' soldiers. It should not be forgotten that for the large amount of troops currently stationed in Afghanistan incidents remain rare, yet it only takes one or two to upset the fragile, if non existent stability that ISAF try to maintain. In a strange paradox of the current 'lone wolf' scenario that western planners continue to raise, the same can be seen in affecting the strategic picture that the US and its allies want to put forward, one that can easily be affected by the actions of one lone actor.

The questions now are concerned with exist dates and strategies, while it will be debated and guessed at by commentators and policy makers alike the bigger question is of course related to legacy. For any positive actions or strategic planning for stability, massacres, cultural misunderstandings or mistakes committed by individuals will undo them. It is for that reason that in modern conflict situations the strategic results are no longer primarily military and nor are they sole responsibility of planners and generals, in fact they have shifted to the soldiers who are exposed to the environment day in and day out. For that reason the importance of the 'strategic corporal' can not be underestimated, whether being utilised for success or in the worst case scenarios of mistakes and incidents.