Tuesday 21 February 2012

RUSI's UK Terrorism Analysis

Just a quick post to draw attention to the Royal United Service Institutes's Report on Counter-Terrorism in an Olympic Year.

As seen in my 2012 predictions I think the security aspect of the Olympic Games will be a key talking point in the security sector in the coming months and RUSI's report is well worth a read.

http://www.rusi.org/ukta




I hope to comment on the report in a few days when I have managed to digest it all!

Monday 13 February 2012

Lone Wolf Terror

Last week The Royal United Service Institute warned of the growing threat of lone wolf terrorists as in coming years Britons fighting and training with radical groups in Somalia and Yemen will return to the UK.

The question is then what does threat does the lone terrorist pose? The simple answer would be to assume that a lone actor is capable of achieving similar if slightly reduced results to terrorist cells, but whilst this is feasible it is perhaps more prudent to look at the different possibilities posed by a single actor than the possible similarities.

'The super empowered angry man' is a different actor to a small terrorist cell, for a start whilst sharing ideals and motives with a larger cause or terrorist organisation the motives and catalysts for action can be much more individually serving. In theory there are many more triggers that could cause a loner to act, from national to specific local issues. Unlike a terror cell which must adopt a group mentality to act, the individual is only concerned with his actions. Similarly the groupthink attitude which can influence a cells actions does not apply.

This can interpreted in many ways, while numbers can provide strength, support, logistical help and a greater will to act the lone actor is not constrained by the limiting factors such as need for meetings and planning with others. This in turn leads to the question of detection, with the communication and group element removed an individual actor can become harder to track as they are potentially harder to detect. Yet that must be considered objectively, any individual acting suspiciously round potential targets or in purchasing materials could be detected as easily as any group, it is the lack of a network or communication group that would potentially making detection harder.

A lone terrorist would have different target options to a terrorist group, it would be foolish to say this limits the threat, yet it changes its implications. For example there could be no coordinated strike such as in 7/7 and the scope for a hijack by a single actor would be limited, especially in the wary world post 9/11. Yet bombings or coordinated chemical attacks are an option, it is important to remember that it does not have to be devastating (statistically not emotionally) to produce a response of terror. Posted chemicals (fake or deadly) or a small explosive device with limited power are still capable of inciting fear; a suicide attack no matter how limited in its effect would still cause a large feel of unease amongst a population who wish to believe their government and security services are capable of thwarting terrorism.

Lone terrorists should not be underestimated, Anders Breivik perpetrator of the 2011 Norway massacre is a prime example of what a ideologically driven individual is capable of. In this situation the selection of the right target (a packed but isolated location) and one of the simplest forms of attack (a weapon carried and operated by himself) lead to tragic and horrific circumstances.

There is a final consideration, the classification of an act by a lone terrorist. Would the press, police and government recognise a lone act as terrorism or try and move the act into a crime setting. Whilst both terrorism and crime are obviously linked let us consider that there is an obvious difference between acts of violent crime and acts of violent terror. A lone wolf could in theory be considered an actor of violent crime rather than terrorism. If one thinks of the many instances of lone gunmen, assassins or bombers in the USA it is only in recent years that they have received a terrorist slant. Previously the acts were blamed on loners, mad men with violent murderous streaks, despite the perpetrators’ having strong ideologies, zealous religious ideas or cult beliefs. The risk is two fold, either an act being upgraded to a terrorist action due to the evidence of strong ideologies or beliefs, or the opposite a terrorist not being identified due to a lack of evidence (especially if harder to trace due acting alone) and the act being considered the actions of a violent loner. In the current threat environment the former is more likely than the latter.

It must be remembered that it is hard to predict whether the individuals who may return to the UK are plotting to undertake terrorist acts or will go through with acts they plan. These individuals would certainly be harder to detect than the ‘terror cells’ which has dominated recent years; but there is time for identification and investigation of these individuals currently operation overseas. For an attack to achieve its maximum potential risks would have to be undertaken by the individual in the planning stage, it is here where the cover offered by working alone can be blown. Similarly the limiting factors of working alone can limit the options and even ultimately the resolve of an individual actor, unless they are willing to carry out a hands on devastating attack similar to Norway. These limitations could make any threat or act hopefully less likely or at worst, less effective. This is no excuse for complacency rather a hopeful outlook of the lone wolf’s limitations.

Monday 6 February 2012

Syria: Homs shelling

Recommended to me by a journalist friend of mine, an insightful video and article from the BBC detailing the current shelling of Homs in Syria. 

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16902819



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Published EU Defence Essay

I have had an essay published online, its currently on the front page http://www.e-ir.info/

permant link: http://www.e-ir.info/2012/02/06/the-eu-in-foreign-policy-a-military-or-civilian-power/


It discusses whether the EU is a military or civilian power, by analysing recent actions, policy and projected power. It is a detailed topical analysis and hopefully explains why the EU is mainly a civilian power in global foreign policy.

Friday 3 February 2012

Predicting the Unpredictable

Though I am no fortune teller and am wary of anyone who tries to guess at future trends without lengthy research and analysis, it would be remiss of me at this early point of the year to not suggest a few areas of that may be of interest in the coming year of International Relations. These are not predictions; more issues which I believe will be key parts of the security agenda in 2012.

After the Spring...
2011 was dominated by the Arab spring, as millions around the world turned their eyes to the various revolutions which changed the Middle East. Libya was the most bloody of the struggles and surely 2012 will see a growing stream of stories of heroism, horror and thought provoking observations which will accompany the aftermath of the Gaddafi regime. Whilst Syria will dominate the headlines in the coming months, the countries which changed the Middle East will be ever present in renewed security assessments of the region. Will military dominated countries like Egypt allow a smooth transition of power to more democratic governance? Will the armed groups who toppled various regimes be content with the inevitable mistakes that will be made in the birth of democratic process? And what of those who will not be content under new governance, those who form the basis of the alternative security dialogue?

Pirates...
The alternative security dialogue forms the basis of another area that will surely still be a focus of security concern in 2012, the continued presence of pirate activity off Somalia, the ‘country’ that remains an example of an alternative security discourse; somewhere that creates its own idea of security in what western orthodox views would see as anarchy and chaos. Increased pressure on the region has seen a large UK, EU and US navy effort in combating piracy, yet hijackings and hostage taking continues to take place. These actions and this region will surely continue to be the focus of security issues throughout 2012, yet will this be a continuation of the status quo or a change in the way this region affects the world.

Security of Sport...
2012 has dominated the sporting agenda in Britain since the announcement of the 30th Olympiad in London on July 6th 2005, the day after the announcement, the attacks of 7/7 set the current security agenda of the UK. Though the two events are linked only by date, the celebration of one is still linked with the fear of the other. Though the security operation surrounding the Olympic Games is a massive one, with huge numbers of police and military personal involved, there is perfectly rational thought process which identifies the games as real target for terrorism. Historically the Munich Olympics shows an example of opportunities for terror, but the presence of London land marks, the tube and huge crowds, presents a target never before seen for current portrayers of terrorism. I am not being overly pessimistic, as I believe and hope that such a plot would not succeed, yet in our conscious to conceive such acts we raise other questions of how securitised do events like this and others have to become now and in the future?  Does our ability to think up deadly scenarios linked to both huge events at day to day lives point at a success by terrorists, the creation of fear? Furthermore how much security is justifiable, when is there too much or too little and is the only way of knowing this gained through an unthinkable failure?

Korea Change...
The Death of Kim Jong-il and ascendancy of Kim Jong-un will be further investigated throughout 2012. Will the relatively unknown leader seek to rule in a continuation of his father’s style, will North Korea change under his rule or is his position weaker than we think? The closed country offers little information to the outsider, yet as with any new regime or leader, there is a risky period following their assuming of office. If he has to prove himself as the country’s Supreme Leader, will he do this through a show of military force in the region or will his methods be more inward looking? Could it be possible that he is the puppet of more hard-line (or equally modernising) generals and figures who will use him as a front for their own actions? I feel it may be likely that we see more sabre rattling in the region, but at the least, the future of North Korea will undoubtedly be shaped by events and actions in the coming year.

UK Military...
After a year which saw the UK military be part of heartfelt number one Christmas number one, the future of the UK military will again be forming news and security commentators’ headlines in 2012. Has the social-military nexus reached its peak with pop music success, or is there more to be had out of the new status of the UK military? Will the new found fame undermine the service’s record of silent service or will those who oppose UK foreign policy and military deployment use this as ammunition? Job cuts will surely bring questions of the UKs future deployments and role to the forefront of debate as will any discussion on Scottish independence and their role in UK foreign policy. Needless to say 2012 as with many years previously will see active discussion of the UK military and its roles.

Doomsday...
Do not fear I have no intention of turning this post into an agreement of those who believe 2012 heralds the end of the known world. However it may be worth considering that there are those who believe this Mayan prediction and it is possible that these believers could bring security risks of their own. It is hard imagine the pre-9/11 world, but it should be remembered that leading up to 2000 there was a genuine fear and risk posed from millennial and apocalyptic cults. These cults where envisioned as posing a conventional, chemical, biological or even nuclear threat in the years leading up to the millennium. Famously Aum Shinrikyo were semi successful in their Tokyo Sarin nerve gas attack of 1995 and it was “with Aum Shinrikyo, the world probably came as close as it has to true nuclear terrorism”(1). Theirs, and other groups’ motives revolved around neo-religious or apocalyptic perceptions of the year 2000 and any possible actions would have not been constrained by the same restrictions that apply to terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda (regional aims, alienating support, constituents, future actions etc.) These groups failed to materialise into anything more than a threat and were ultimately overshadowed by events in 2001, yet in the late 1990s there was genuine analysis of these cults. If cults like this were going to experience resurgence it would have begun several years ago, but considering the amount of cults in the USA alone it is possible that some event or issue may arise in 2012. I do not suggest these is going to be a surge of cult activity in 2012 but it may be an area worth paying attention to, a wild card in the possible events and issues of 2012.

The Unexpected...
So what about everything else? There is bound to be some issue that reaches the security agenda in 2012 that nobody will predict. Could it be renewed tension round the Falklands? A super power re –affirming its place in the world? Or a completely new threat arising? No doubt some topic that none of us would suggest in the early days of 2012 will become a major talking point, and memorable feature of this year.
The above and many other issues will contribute to the security and conflict agenda, 2012 like the years that have precede it will have unique events and continuing developments, the key question is whether what transpires will be a predictable continuation of current trends, or the start of a new direction for global security?

(1 )FROST, R. 2005. Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11. Adelphi Papers. 45 (378).

Wednesday 1 February 2012

A Notable Reminder

It seems only right that I mark the start of this security blog, with the key story on the day of its launch; The guilty plea of Mohammed Chowdhury, Shah Rahman, Gurukanth Desai and Abdul Miah, 4 men who have admitted to planning to detonate a bomb at the London Stock Exchange. The men arrested in December 2010, pleaded guilty to engaging in conduct in preparation for acts of terrorism serve as reminder that terrorism on UK soil is still a very real threat.

The men, all British nationals, admitted planning to detonate a bomb at the London Stock Exchange, as part of a wider group of 9 which was plotting other attacks including letter bombs and pub bombings.

Whilst the trial and sentencing will be a matter for the news and public opinion, the more pressing questions lie within the ongoing debate over home-grown terrorism.

This case bears all the hallmarks that both students of terrorism and lovers of security based dramas are all familiar with; secluded meetings, contact over the internet, radical inspiration, logistical planning, sketches, target lists, terrorism literature and target observation. Similarly the plot being uncovered has a certain familiarity to it, MI5 surveillance, and a counter terrorism police operation. Could it be suggested that normality, a strange routine has begun to emerge in these cases?

To the security providers themselves the answer would be a resounding no, yet the layman could dismiss this as another case of radicalised fantasists who have had their comeuppance. Yet as the BBC’s Matt Prodger points out, it could have been very different there is a fine line between fantasy and realism, they could have remained undetected, they could have carried out these attacks.

The many questions, which sadly cannot be answered here, now stem from a decade of living under this threat of terrorism (and many more decades of other sources of terror). Are we safe? What threats are out there?  When will this happen again?

Yet there are more hidden questions that have a more abstract thought process, Will there ever be a successful attack, are these terrorists any good? Or have we grown more resilient, are we less disturbed by these revelations? For example think back to the amount of news time this would have gained in the post 9/11 years (admittedly this view plays to one of my key thesis that our understanding of terrorism is shaped very much by the media).

Undoubtedly there would be ways for this view to change; the most shocking would be a destructive attack itself, something which all conscious people must secretly fear in 2012, a year in which so much attention is being drawn on London and Britain. A simpler catalyst would be a plot uncovered which didn’t play to these ‘norms’, something wholly different yet equally as chilling.

I do not suggest there is complacency, certainly not in the security providers who have stepped up their role in line with the pressures of 2012.  Perhaps then in a period dominated with questions of reaching out to disenfranchised and disinterested groups with in society, the question that has always been present but never been answered over the last 10 years should once again be considered; why do these ideas of hatred, and violence grow within our country. Perhaps today, along with anniversaries of both failed and successful terrorist efforts and visual demonstrations of anti-British sentiment should be a reminder that there is still much to do on a societal level in the provision of security for the UK.