“In every new set of engagements post-World War II – Vietnam, Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq – we have discovered, after the fact, things we should have known because they’d been learned previously. What this suggests is that, though the military publishes and even distributes them, no one really learns ‘lessons learned’” [Simons A: IN Mc Ivor AD [ed]: Rethinking the Principles of War, Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2005, page 336]
George Santayana warns ‘Those that do not learn from the lessons of the past are condemned to repeat them.’[1] This view is often held by many as a fundamental approach to history, nowhere is it perceived more applicable than with in military planning and application. Yet this ignores the largely held and debated view that the military does not take heed of ‘lessons learned.’ The idea that military lessons are ignored is the centre of wide reaching debate for and against this view, but more critically is the subject of both scholarly and militarily review as to why this occurs and to what extent do lessons learned have in a new generation of warfare. Analysts and Historians provide deep arguments either way; William Fuller acknowledges the importance of military lessons but warns of their shelf life. Anthony Cordesman concludes that though it is useful to try ‘understanding the whole nature of modern conflict is impossible.’[2] In contrast Schandler speaks of the extent lessons from Vietnam have affected the contemporary military policies. To this extent I aim to establish what lessons learned are, to what extent they are ignored and crucially that the lessons of previous wars have changing relevance in today’s warfare. The US involvement in Vietnam, Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq will be the main conflicts examined in the establishment of to what extent lessons are remembered, this in its self will provide insight on where lessons can be learned from.
The idea of a military lesson can roughly be summarised into several different aspects; historical lessons, operational lessons, methods and wrong methods. Historical lessons are the by product of thousands of years of warfare, some are enshrined in the works of famous military theorists such as Sun Tzu or Clausewitz whilst other historical lessons are simpler and have evolved due to mankind’s growth being interlinked with warfare. Operational lessons are the result of a certain military experience and can be seen on many levels from the functionality of equipment in the operational environment, to operational performance of units and command structure. Yet it is with methods and wrong methods that the most examined lessons learned emerge; it is here military analysts find out how every aspect from planning, execution and aftermath has affected the overall outcome. It is from these guidelines we can gain an overall sense of military lessons, it is important to view them as working in conjunction, where historical lessons and operational experience are often hidden away in military commentaries, methods employed and even more often methods that fail are at the forefront of military studies. A wrong method by its very nature is likely to cause problems and therefore be more prevalent; the failure in Vietnam will always overshadow any successful methods that were employed and completely obscure the operational efficiency of a piece of equipment. Body bags will always count for more than new tactics and that lack of tolerance for casualties is echoed in all critics and does lend a certain bias to an engrained sense of failure. Yet it is from all these aspects that lessons are learnt.
It is from these different levels that a problem of assessing the attention to lessons learned emerges; at what level do these lessons get incorporated? This can be seen in the way they are presented. As stated the army publishes and distributes them; the Joint Commands host ‘lessons learned’ databases and there are ‘516 volumes in the Naval war colleges archives that contain lesson in the title.’[3] It does not stop at just archiving lessons, a long list of distributed works are manuals which directly convey lessons learnt, to all ranks of the military forces. For example between 1963 and 1973 ‘FM 31-15 Operations Against Irregular Forces, FM 31-16 Counterguerilla Operations and PAM 550-104 Human Factors of Underground Insurgencies’[4] were all being widely distributed in a time which both contemporary and modern critics have criticised for a lack of reaction to the new threats of warfare. Therefore it is crucial to consider that the working documents of the military do incorporate lessons that may simply be overlooked based on what level they are acted upon. A key rule proposed in 1967 field manual warns of ‘the dangers of separating ourselves from the people.’[5] This plays right into the argument of lessons are learnt, but then ignored, when considering the subsequent wars in which the US managed to alienate the very people they went to help. However another option must be proposed that this and other key lessons were acted upon operationally and on the ground but failed to reach into the overall incorporation required for such tactics to take hold; the adoption into overall policy and grand strategy controlled not by the soldiers operationally or the writers of military manuals but the Overall Military Commanders and Senior politicians.
Far from being just a defence of soldiers actions, the assessment on where ‘lessons learned’ are incorporated has much deeper contexts. For example in Somalia, one of the overlooked sides of the conflict was the increased political role of officers on the ground and their interactions with locals in both negotiation and hostile situations, whilst this was performed well and incorporated as part of the operational functions of field commanders, it was swiftly forgotten by senior officers and planners with the withdrawal from the country. This can be coupled with the aforementioned operational lessons in terms of incorporating lessons learned into strategy; operational experiences which lead to new methods, often only become apparent after a certain period in conflicts as accounts and different experiences are pooled together. The experiences of a unit on the ground in Baghdad being different from those faced by a unit operating in the desert based oil fields. It is to this extent therefore that to establish the full extent of how much attention is paid to these lessons their adoption must be analysed on both the ground and at the Command level. Furthermore this affects how lessons learnt are put through the military system some come from experience on the ground and filter up where others have been adopted into grand strategy and are indoctrinated into military operations from above.
It would be hard to argue that the military does not ignore previous lessons, there are too many examples to the contrary, Iraq and Afghanistan both represent examples of this, military planners ignored previous lessons on counterinsurgency such as the tactics used by Vietnamese, or the urban lessons of Somalia. The crux of the matter therefore is to how deep does this lesson learned ignorance run, Simons mentions the fact that things that had been previously learnt are ignored yet this is fundamentally tied to the way military planners want to perceive war as conventional. The last 65 years of warfare has been dominated by an unprecedented change in how wars are fought, but the Military has seemed to ignore this in its Operational functions. Where the opportunity has existed for constant updating and revision of its practises it has reverted to type in sticking to forcing conventional solutions on unconventional situations. No finer example exists than in Cordesman’s review of lessons learnt after 8 years of fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq; insure valid reasons for war, fully understand host country and overall ‘do not commit to conventional conflict if unready for unconventional follow up.’[6] These lessons are not new and appear in some form in major reviews and histories of the Vietnam conflict. The main and most far reaching element of the ignorance toward lessons learnt is the fact unconventional warfare is not the most prominent element of military planning. Documents such as the Air force doctrine prove that the continued planning is within the frameworks of conventional warfare. Nearly every commentary from Afghanistan and Iraq continue to mention the unprepared state the army found itself in when the combat shifted from conventional to unconventional operations. If such doctrines are to be drawn from experience, the Vietnam and Somalia examples are there, but lessons can also be drawn from history, any post imperial colonial uprising provides a history of the growing reliance of irregular warfare and US backed groups such as the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan brings it even closer to home. As referred to in over half the texts Clausewitz states it clearly, the ‘most important rule for the statesman is to know what kind of war on which they are embarking.’[7]
To move away from the doctrinal problems; further examples of the far reaching ignorance of lessons learned and their implications lie within the various Arms of the military. The need for a clearer doctrine based on past lessons can easily be seen in the use of air power. Vietnam showed the original limitations; its limited ability in the combat against the Vietcong, not only was air power restricted under President Johnson, even when used to full effect it was estimated ‘$6.00 was spent to do $1.00 of damage.’[8] Where adaptations have been made supremacy is still only felt in the conventional stages of Iraq and Afghanistan, it has had further reduced effect in the prolonged war against insurgency. The US Air force doctrine mentions the ‘power to control the enemy’s military, economic and political power at risk.’[9] This is completely ignoring the lessons learned and overlooks an enemy that operates outside conventional military boundaries and has little economic and political goals other than humiliation of the US. The use of Armour has also been the source of oversight in its role in unconventional warfare, the slow progress in narrow conditions during the battle of Mogadishu, the vulnerability to roadside bombs and the limitations of urban use; ‘insurgents hidden in buildings or rubble are little more vulnerable to a 2001 M1A2 than to a 1918 Mark IV.’[10] While this view may overlook certain aspects of amours psychological effects on both enemy and friendly forces it does present two key points that have been learned but not necessarily instigated to the full. That technology cannot provide victory in unconventional war. Technology should not be overlooked, drones for example provide excellent intelligence resources, but should never be a replacement for human intelligence. Furthermore the very technology that is used to fight these wars is what has driven the enemy to use ‘unconventional warfare as the only way to challenge post industrial states.’[11] Secondly the overall importance that warfare still needs men on the ground.
The need for men on the ground however not only brings us back to the lesson of the need for a clear strategic aim but it also begins to highlight the counterargument, that lessons learned do not hold all the answers. Firstly though the reliance of men on the ground is a lesson from the very beginnings of warfare, to win you need men to put forward control; yet the experiences of the USA’s modern wars have presented a much harder concept, the nation building aspect, where frontline troops become the very symbol of not a regime of outside control but the supposed reconstruction of a political system. In every example it has failed Vietnam had too weak a government to defend, Iraq has been unleashed into religious and political violence due to the lack of a strong leader and Afghanistan is so fractured that it is considered by ‘to be no longer a nation.’[12] Once again the planners overlooked previous experiences FMFRP 12-14 from Vietnam speaks of the importance of civil skills, World War II a wealth of German and Japanese fluent officers were created to deal with occupation and interaction. the Somalia experience of frontline interactions; yet still in Afghanistan in 2004 Brigadier General Blackledge was warning of ‘a shortage of civil officer experts’[13] However it is with this, that lessons learned can be turned on their head the very fact they are not incorporated goes to highlight the lack of options that face a military power that cannot fathom the idea that their system will not work elsewhere. The very idea that a western political system will not be embraced can in fact be alien to US military planners, all commentaries continue to outline the need of increased nation building by the military but ignore the most important ideas that ‘war will not have an outcome where a desirable government, economy society and alliance will magically occur at the end of the fighting.’[14] Countries like Afghanistan and Iraq have no cultural basis for western democracy and therefore will not embrace it. Afghanistan is an even stronger example due to the resistance of another political imposition attempted by the USSR. This therefore means that if the military is going to ignore lessons in both military application on the ground, in its various planning and doctrinal elements; but most crucially in the way it feels it can justify the very wars it fights there is a large lack of a learning curve.
This is not a turn to a liberal attitude of the view of contemporary wars; though the growing media attitude surrounding deaths in both Iraq and Afghanistan does provide a voice to those views. Yet ironically the way to find how the military does learn, harks back to the liberalism felt in the US during the Vietnam war; that is it learns the hard way through defeat. Vietnam was so ingrained into the American memory through veterans, films and the death toll that it went beyond enforcing lessons it took them too far. Somalia was a prime example of this the fear of an death toll combined with the loss of two of its technological symbols in black hawk helicopters forced a feeling of what Baumann calls ‘Vietmalia’[15] and the subsequent approach to warfare that involves minimum risk and maximum protection. This can be seen in the planning for the Gulf war which had the casualty estimation much higher than anticipated and relied heavily on conventional air force supremacy. Yet if this is an example of how the military learns it is also twinned with another flawed attitude to lessons that is ‘US lesson learning is only one deep,’[16] i.e. the last war. This view may go to show why the Operations went ahead in both Iraq and Afghanistan; following the overall tactical success of the first Gulf war. Yet that victory, as well as all the contemporary conventional stage victories, play in to the counter arguments of both that lessons are not ignored, or that they are not always applicable.
Victory in conventional warfare stages of contemporary conflicts do take on lessons from previous wars, the success of Operation Iraqi Freedom used General Tommy Franks knowledge and research on the First Gulf War, and Central Command managed to ‘execute an operation that took out Iraq’s military forces, removed Saddam and seized the oil infrastructure in 21 days.’[17] Yet it was the same Command that refused to recognize the insurgency problem for 11 months before openly admitting it was no longer the death throes of the old regime. Other elements of each modern war has had its tactical moments or skillful operations; In Vietnam the army never lost a battle to the North Vietnamese Army, yet these are overshadowed by the supposed lessons against the Viet Cong. Statistical based arguments favour in the ignorance of some lessons learned they count as too many variables in a already hard to predict business, predictions for victories based on statistical models are less accurate than tossing a coin’[18]Yet while the argument exists for both the ignorance of lessons learned and the counter that they are used; another option is present in that it is these very lessons which present the biggest problem to the planning and operations of the military. For a start the very idea of military lessons are argued so much there is no clear agreement within the historiography of certain areas, what may be taken as established by one is dismissed by another. Wolhstetter of the RAND cooperation warned ‘of all the disasters of Vietnam, the worst may be the lessons that we’ll draw from it.’[19] Whilst others such as Summers draw conclusions from such lessons. This is just part of the problem however as one massive effect must be taken into consideration; the fact that doctrinal planning, adoption of lessons learned and all military planning at one stage or another involves some form of history, which is therefore open to interpretation.
History remains the key aspect of doctrinal development, whilst experience is important ‘the army does not make strategy,’[20] that a role lies with politicians, and they therefore have the role in interpreting the history of conflicts in search of a strategic framework. The problem of interpretation is that it is unique to an individual’s perception. The historical context of war also has deep roots that influence the overall reliance on conventional war. Fuller points out that three styles exist in interpretation. The antique; a reliance on the unchanging nature of war. The positivist view; war as progressive, changing with industry and development. Finally the pragmatic view; war has no set precedent and is ever changing. The fact that warfare encounters the problems of ignoring lessons learned can be traced back to the reliance on set parameters of war. The Clausewitzian view of knowing what war one is facing does not take into account the war may not have any precedent at all. The idea can be developed in two ways. Firstly, a new interpretation of old wars or secondly, the idea that modern wars are unprecedented. The later idea has implications of fourth Generation warfare, an enemy unrestrained by western boundaries, it is becoming part of military thought FM 3-24 warns ‘you cannot fight an Islamic extremist the way you have fought the Viet Cong.’[21]However this view ignores that you do not have to fight them the same way but you should be aware of similarities. Far more credible is the former idea which put forward by Jonathan Gomez which does not link insurgency warfare purely to the present and suggests lessons from throughout history which have been held back by the ideas of conventional warfare embodied by chivalry and religious context. It is further suggested that the very embodiment of insurgency warfare was present in every major war and therefore lessons should not be grouped into the old frameworks such as modern and middle age warfare.
To Conclude it is important to remember warfare is a human enterprise and as such has many variables that cannot be simply be seen as clear cut as the experiences of the last war. The enemy learns lessons and adapts; as such this review has place in the larger context of the global lessons by both side in changing warfare. Lessons learned take on different styles and locations and to establish whether they are being ignored it is first important to establish at what level do certain lessons fit in, Grand Strategy or operational tactics. The idea of what extent they are being ignored again is not a straight answer as shown it requires the need to establish what kind of framework it fits into, conventional lessons are still being applied, but it is there use in conventional warfare that is blocking the experience of other lessons picked up which fit into more unconventional parameters. The last war should be as relevant as much earlier historical basis. The most important factor though is are these lessons learned relevant, yes they have relevance but must not be viewed two dimensionally, they should interact outside of traditional frameworks, and influence a wider range of military thought, one not constrained by the harsh reality of if things going wrong. If new conflicts are the exporting of democracy, lessons will need to be different and fit in far more with adaptable policy than strict operational procedures, FM 3-24 does hint this may be happening through a lesson that cannot be ignored ‘war is a game of wits and you have to adapt to survive.’[22]
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[1] William C. Fuller, ‘What is a Military Lesson?’, in Strategic Studies, A Reader, ed. by Thomas G. Mahnken and Joseph A. Maiolo (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), pp.34-50 (p.34).
[2]Fuller, p.48.
[3]Ibid, p.36.
[4] James Kiras, ‘Irregular Warfare’ Understanding Modern Warfare ed. David Jordan and others, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008),pp. 222-266 (p.262).
[5]United States Marine Corps, FMFRP 12-41 Professional Knowledge Gained from Operational Experience in Vietnam 1967 (Washington D.C: Department of the Navy. 1989), p.438.
[6]Anthony H. Cordesman, ‘Shape, Clear, Hold, and Build: "The Uncertain Lessons of the Afghan & Iraq Wars’, Centre for Strategic Studies and International Studies (2009) http://csis.org/publication/shape-clear-hold-and-build-uncertain-lessons-afghan-iraq-wars.html (accessed 11 January 2010) ( p.4).
[7] Fuller, p.34.
[8] Mark Clodfelter, The limits of Air Power: the American bombing of North Vietnam (London: Collier Macmillan, 1989), p.134.
[10] Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), p.53.
[11] Kiras, p.229.
[12] Anthony H. Cordesman, ‘The Ongoing lessons of Afghanistan: War fighting, Intelligence, Force Transformation and Nation Building’, Centre for Strategic Studies and International Studies (2004) http://csis.org/publication/ The-Ongoing-lessons-of-Afghanistan: War fighting-Intelligence- Force-Transformation-and-Nation-Building.html (accsesd 11 January 2010) (p.29).
[13] Anthony H. Cordesman, ‘The Ongoing lessons of Afghanistan’,p.81.
[14] Ibid, p.150.
[15] Robert Baumann and LawrenceYates, My clan against the world : US and coalition forces in Somalia, 1992-1994 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004) http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/clan.pdf (accessed 11 January 2010) (p.169).
[16] Baumann,and Yates, p.191.
[17] Kiras,p.227.
[18] Biddle,p.21.
[19] Austin Long, On ‘Other War’ Lessons From Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research (Santa Monica: RAND, 2006), p.14.
[20] Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context (New York: Dell 1984), p.2.
[21] United States Marine Corps, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, (Washington D.C: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2006), p.1.
[22] United States Marine Corps, FM 3—24, p.1.
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