How Counterinsurgents Learn from History and Experience.

“The Experience of the past years clearly shows that the Afghan problem cannot be solved by military means only” (Tsagoiov 1987, cited in Hughes 2008 p.1), a statement that rings true two decades later, making the US seem to have overlooked history; but when Colonel Tsagoiov summed up the Soviet experience it also showed a disregard for a whole range of previous military experiences by themselves and others. To this extent parallels can be drawn from across history which show examples of militaries seemingly ignoring the lessons of counterinsurgency (COIN) and making the same mistakes, which either they or other countries have previously made. To the cynical this represents an ongoing trend of reliance on conventional force and being geared to fight the previous war; to moderates a lack of adaptation; but what this view overlooks is the general and in recent years concise effort to learn from history and experience. As Fuller points out, since Vietnam the US army has kept ‘lessons learned’ databases and an extensive catalogue of experience based literature (Fuller 2008 p.36) furthermore the recent explosion of COIN literature focuses most of its recommendations from success and failure in the past. This essay will therefore outline how practitioners of COIN make an effort to learn from history and experience, but it will also analyse their shortcomings. By reviewing the application of history we can see its merits, but also where the blinkered approach ignores wider historical lessons. Furthermore I will explain how some of the lessons from history are unsuitable for application in situations such as Iraq and Afghanistan and that strategy, culture and an approach to warfare as a whole, are all equally as critical factors in COIN.

The divisions over the application of history and experience fall into various groups, with some arguing the benefits of historical study and others seeing it as limited in its application, W. Fuller claims that the concept of a military lesson might be dubious (2008 p.44) where as J.F.C. Fuller claims that to ignore the application of historical experience turns its study into “nothing but a bloody romance” (1926, cited in Cordesmann 2004b). It is wiser to consider that historical experience does indeed have its place but as I will show, has limitations based upon the differences between situations. It is also important to remember the scope of history in context with learning from it. COIN literature tends to focus on the period Kilcullen calls, classic COIN experience and theory, mainly from 1944-1980 (2006 p.112). This, however, overlooks the early years of COIN in its colonial setting at the turn of the century, such as the Boer War or the US in the Philippines. Furthermore, it ignores many of the earlier examples of dealing with insurgency, such as situations from the Napoleonic wars right back to the Roman Empire. As Beckett argues, insurgency has been a factor of war since the start of history and is mentioned in antiquity such as in the Bible, by Tacitus or by Sun Tzu (2001 p.8). This is not to say I advocate the reliance on classical history as being the same as modern problems but as Gumz explains there is a potential for a greater understanding of history by moving away from the conventional to non-conventional evolution of warfare which creates rigid frames of old and new. (2009). Therefore, understanding there is a bias to the ideas of new wars helps us understand how counterinsurgents learn from history. Quite rightly, they wish to find examples that fit with warfare in an age of globalisation, human rights, global terrorism and the internet. This therefore leads to looking closer to the modern age rather than delving deep into the history books, but two ideas should be considered. Firstly, there is no direct precedent for many of the new elements of warfare. Secondly, operational and tactical experiences of the last 60 years have been tailored for application in today’s COIN environments, so why can examples from 200 years ago not be as well? To answer the latter would be to veer off into perspectives of military history, but it is important to consider when analysing what militaries adopt and learn from.

Regardless of which historical perspective and scope, various scholars who have used the literature in the last decade have been almost unanimous at pointing to the same recommendations, failings and lessons that the US and its coalition partners need to address. Namely, legitimacy, good governance, unity of effort, interagency approach, winning over the population and committing to COIN both in terms of time and approach. These ideas are built upon the experiences of COIN since World War II and represent the efforts to analyse experience and use its lessons for the current situations. Empirically, the recommendations are obviously related to historical experiences, the interagency and leadership examples can be seen as products of the problems of split civilian, intelligence and military approach of the US in Vietnam; the good governance and population support where key approaches of the British in Malaya. Both failures and successes become key to the development of COIN yet it would be wrong to think the literature was ultimately forward thinking in its recommendations, using history as the basis for its study.

As Reis explains in his analysis of British, French and Portuguese COIN, “doctrines emerge as reactions to ongoing campaigns” (2006 p.33), similarly the approaches being suggested by RAND and FM 3-24 are in reaction to the current situations and then using history to back these suggestions up. This then differs from conventional military history, which traditionally uses a war to update its approaches, but ultimately means militaries are fighting the last war. In the situation of COIN the use of history is not linear with analyses being made by fishing experience from the past. As previously mentioned, this is not necessarily a bad approach, nor is it right to think that literature has not existed prior to recent years. The doctrinal changes suggested in the 1960s, in addition to the works of Galula, show that there has been COIN available, but the sudden boost in COIN material; with more books written in the 4 years before 2006 than there had been in the previous 4 decades (Kilcullen 2006 p.111) showing that COIN history is chequered and reactionary rather than evolutionary.

Based on this view the analysis of how counterinsurgents learn reaches a crossroads, it could be argued that this use of history and experience is entirely justified; indeed there is nothing wrong with seeking historical evidence to back up the desired contemporary approach. Yet it is more prudent to accept this as the norm but highlight the inherent problems of such an approach and then couple this with the problems of adapting COIN history as a whole. The most cynical analysis would say that in adapting COIN in a reactionary fashion actually shows that counterinsurgents do not learn from history and experience, but rather borrow from it when the situation requires. This certainly seems apparent with the almost parallel development of COIN doctrines in the Vietnam and then Iraq wars (Long 2008). Yet to agree entirely with this view would mean to ignore genuine efforts by some, such as special forces, academics and forward thinkers to put COIN history in the mainstream and its experiences into doctrine throughout the decades where it “waxed and waned” (Long 2006). It then becomes more prudent to accept this as a genuine deficit in the learning process of COIN and actually identify this as a historical experience lesson in its own right; “Vietmalia” (Holbrooke 1998, cited in Baumann and Yates 2004 p.2) is a genuine fear, much like Lieutenant Colonel Francois explains Algeria was for the French (2007). Not only do countries learn from COIN operations, they can also learn they do not like them, especially one with a deep mark on the nation’s history. It would be naive to think that COIN situations could be avoided, as they have evolved as the only challenge available to the militaries that were built up, ironically under the massive focus on conventional warfare doctrines. Yet it goes someway to explaining why COIN took a back seat post Vietnam, when the Cold War and threat of European conventional war was still a possibility and that its history is now undergoing resurgence due to operational requirement.

Fundamentally that is not the problem; the problem arises in two by-products of such an approach. Firstly and theoretically, will this be the case at the conclusion of every COIN operation, as it is seen as different to the conventional warfare that doctrines and armies are primarily designed for? Secondly, does such an approach bring further problems due to its wish to find answers from the past? To answer the first in line with the essay, it is hard to predict but the question is an important consideration into how militaries and politicians look at COIN. As Long points out after Iraq there are possibly other conventional enemies (2008) and to truly learn from COIN would be to keep its experiences indoctrinated even if not directly in use. The second point is a clear signpost to deeper analysis of how COIN history is used. It is true to say that most current military assessments and commentators recommendations are happy to use prior experiences yet are wary of their application. From the start FM 3-24 clearly outlines “you cannot fight former Saddamists and Islamic Extremists the same way as we fought the Viet Cong” (US Department of the Army 2006 p.1). Even concurrent successful COIN operations cannot be directly applied to others hence Glenn’s chapter “Fitting RAMSI’s square peg into the world’s round hole” (2007 p.12). In itself this represents a crucial historical COIN lesson that success in one area is not directly transportable, be that on a tactical, regional, historical or as demonstrated here, operational level. Such an understanding therefore shows that the contemporary approach to COIN does have a logical historical approach.

Where the logic falls down however, is that such an approach inevitably leads to a less then concise historical analysis; making the lessons borrowed from experience be taken very generally rather than truly scrutinising them for the factors behind victory or failure. As previously mentioned, the successes of the British in Malaya are cited as good examples for COIN but their experiences are taken generally in terms of good governance and being population-centric, as the overall experience is considered a relic of Imperialism and hard to apply due to its colonial setting (Reis 2005 p.31). In only taking general lessons, some of the deeper operational and tactical experiences are therefore overlooked; the British use of civil expertise, autonomy of battalion structure, use of ID cards and  importance of low level command, have direct links with the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan but get ignored due to its colonial and therefore seemingly limited application. (Mackinlay and al-Baddawy 2008) This can of course be turned on its head, in that in addition to ignoring some of the deeper lessons of previous COIN and despite FM 3-24’s assurance of the difference of current situations; recommendations and commentaries try to find suitable historical examples for the situations that are simply unprecedented. Cynically this could be a guilty response to the gap in COIN history, but nevertheless the need to back up suggestions with historical experience will seemingly fall flat in the search for answers to global jihad, internet propaganda and non-regional insurgents. As Olson points out there are now ungovernable areas as a product of global media and globalisation which are new options for insurgents (2007).Furthermore whilst Islamic ideals can be studied this does not offer an operational strategy for COIN on the ground. Historically COIN has not got a great success record and seen as many of the options are considered of limited use due to their colonial or historical setting, those seeking to find answers are left with few options. Whilst Mackinlay and al-Baddawy point to a deeper understanding of the Israel and Palestine experience as a possible source for answers (2008); we see that there is also a deficit in militaries learning from the experiences of those outside doctrinal similarities. As Thompson pointed out, COIN has a national history and is rarely developed from the experiences of others (1969, cited in Mackinlay and al-Baddawy 2008 p.8). Whilst this has evolved to those sharing similar experiences through coalitions it explains why the Soviet experience in Afghanistan was ignored and points out the avoidance of the darker side of COIN; barbarism.

A paradox emerges when considering barbarism in COIN, quite rightly would be counterinsurgents seek to avoid it, eschewing its use both currently and finding no positives from its historical use. It serves as a reminder of failures; such as the French in Algeria and also galvanises the principles of population support, legitimacy and good governance. Its avoidance also covers up the chilling but realistic view of the power that outright barbarism has in stopping insurgency; whether it be massacres by the Ottomans, Romans or Nazis, the idea of “making a wasteland and calling it peace” (Tacitus n.d., cited in Luttwak 2007 p.41) still represents the impracticable side of COIN. Several considerations arise from this, such as are there any useful elements from the barbarism style of COIN? Or does it represent an alternative security and order discourse? Yet whilst it is unlikely COIN practitioners will ever try and separate the positives of Roman style deterrence from the barbarism, what emerges instead is the aforementioned paradox. The paradox is that separating desired COIN from a barbaric approach is a cultural decision as much as it is a strategic and operational one; and that culture is one of the crucial areas where counterinsurgents fail to address. Not only a cultural understanding of the nation or area where COIN is to take place, but an understanding of their own culture, both how it effects COIN development and how it is perceived by those who COIN seeks to influence.

The former and latter points are among the many findings of the COIN literature based from the historical experiences which point to the need to understand a nation’s culture and how to portray one’s own. It is perhaps the lesson which seems to be the hardest to follow despite its historical basis. Certainly the latter point, as all prior experience points to the need for population support leading to the rise of the “strategic privates and civilians” (Kilcullen 2006 p.114) as direct embodiments of the mission and culture of the COIN operation. This lesson is merged with all others as it effects the approaches of the operation; it can explain why democracy and human rights are used to try and achieve COIN, but without an understanding of the host culture it can lead to failure. Thus it can be all traced back to the main analysis of how counterinsurgents learn from history and experience and ultimately it is through the lens and framework of a nation’s strategic culture.

To use the USA as an example is prudent as they are driving force behind today’s COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the example is not limited to them. Britain’s COIN is shaped by its former Imperial culture; the Soviet approach in Afghanistan was influenced by its repressive culture. The USA, as Gray points out, ignores the traits which build up its strategic culture and are ultimately damaging to COIN operations ; being apolitical, astrategic, techno-dependent, focused on firepower, offensively balanced, culturally challenged, ahistorical and impatient (2006). Whilst all the points contribute to the USA’s approach it is the last 3 that seemingly fly in the face of learning from historical experience. As Gray further demonstrates US COIN if not its whole approach to war in general has suffered since the Indian wars with “a failure to understand the enemy of the day” (2006 p.34) Furthermore the approach to the past at best demonstrates a staggered reactionary learning process and at worst plays into the hands of those who accuse militaries of not learning from the past. Rightly or wrongly parallels are drawn with Vietnam and the ‘body bag effect’ sidesteps the massive difference in casualty figures; as Colin Powell stated about Somalia “what wouldn’t have merited a press conference in Vietnam” (Baumann and Yates 2004 p.2) lead to inglorious withdrawal in Somalia. There are those who still have an axe to grind over Vietnam and there are those to which history was in the past and that is where it shall stay; both are dangerous options for formulating COIN strategy. Yet it is Gray’s mention of impatience that is the best indicator in an analysis of learning from history.

Time is ultimately the measurement of COIN operations; success and failure are linked with a change in government, the withdrawal from a country, but as the old adage states ‘only time will tell’. Time enshrines actions into history and then ultimately the process of scrutinising places the experience into a framework for those who seek to learn from it. That is what is happening now, and will continue to do so. Yet no conclusion can be complete without the major consideration put forward in FM 3-24 “there is no silver bullet” (2006 p.1-28). COIN is marked by paradoxes; you can win militarily but lose overall, or more security can make you less secure. Only when viewed as an ever changing landscape can an assessment of how counterinsurgents learn from the past truly come forward, I have previously argued the change in military affairs and an observation made there is equally relevant here; “it is important to remember warfare is a human enterprise and as such has many variables, that cannot be as clear cut as the experience of the last war” (Cheetham 2009 p.9). What that presents us with models not templates (Glenn 2007) and that the use of history and experience is not the holy grail of COIN.

That being said, those who ignore history do so at their peril, it is why we have arrived at the sudden need for past COIN examples and the growth in those seeking them, in conclusion one must consider the ignorance of previous decades as well as the current situation. It would be wrong to fall into of the trap of saying counterinsurgents do not learn from the past. Evidence is clear that efforts are made, though it has been a roundabout process in which examples for the past are sought to back up contemporary analyses. Many lessons of history are still ignored, yet in addition so are many contemporary recommendations. This relates to the simple fact that all the literature, doctrines and ideas do not put boots on and go to Iraq or Afghanistan. Learning from COIN experience is only half the problem; implicating and using those lessons is an equally difficult  task. Overall, COIN is part of a wider approach that straddles the grey area of political and military policy and only with a correct strategy can a solid COIN operation be conducted; a strategy, which is ultimately influenced by experience and strategic culture thus compounding the need to understand history and its lessons. Counterinsurgents learn from history by comparing the need of the day with lessons of the past. There is still more that could be adopted in analysis and it needs to happen on a larger scale than just at a recommendation and doctrinal level, but overall it is a better approach than the denial seen in previous years. “Historical feasibility” (Kalev 2005 p.12) has become a key part of developing ideas, considering it took several years of COIN failure to bring this approach in, one can only hope that after the current set of engagements end it remains part of the process. 

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